Mali’s Junta Secures $438 Million from Barrick Gold in Mining Dispute Resolution

Mark Bristow, CEO of Barrick Gold, the Canadian mining giant and the world’s second-largest gold producer, is well-acquainted with disputes involving African governments. In an interview with The Economist at a major African mining conference in Cape Town this month, he reflected on past clashes with leaders in Tanzania and Congo, likening them to an experienced boxer recalling old bouts. He dismissed an arrest warrant issued by Mali’s government in December—accusing him of money laundering and financial violations, allegations he denies—as simply part of doing business in difficult regions. “Mining is a long-term game,” Bristow stated. “The best way to resolve misunderstandings or disagreements is through dialogue.”

His approach appears to have paid off. On February 19, Reuters reported that Barrick and Mali had reached an agreement to resolve a nearly two-year dispute that had led to the suspension of mining operations contributing between 5% and 10% of the country’s GDP. The Malian government had accused Barrick of unpaid dues and unspecified social and environmental violations, initially demanding $500 million in back taxes—a figure later raised to $5.5 billion. Under the new deal, Barrick will pay $438 million. In return, the government will release four senior local employees who had been imprisoned on charges of money laundering and financing terrorism. Additionally, the state will return hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of gold ore that it began seizing late last year.

Despite the agreement, the situation highlights the growing difficulties Western mining firms face in the region. Governments across Africa, from Ivory Coast to Zambia, are revising mining codes to secure higher revenues and larger ownership stakes, spurred by rising global demand for minerals. With gold prices at record highs and metals like copper and lithium crucial for the green transition, these changes reflect a broader shift.

Nowhere is resource nationalism more pronounced than in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, a region often referred to as Africa’s coup belt. These states, rich in minerals such as gold and uranium, are increasingly aligned with Russia and resistant to Western influence. However, their unpredictable and heavy-handed tactics in dealing with foreign investors could ultimately undermine their own economic ambitions.

Mali’s junta, which seized power in 2020, has led the charge in tightening control over the mining sector. A state-commissioned audit, which Mark Bristow dismisses as “incorrect,” claimed the government had lost nearly $1 billion in revenues. In response, the junta introduced a revised mining code in 2023, eliminating tax and customs exemptions and increasing the state’s potential ownership in mining projects from 10% to 30%. Controversially, the new regulations were applied retroactively to existing operations rather than just future projects. To enforce compliance, the government has “incrementally increased demands and procedural pressure,” according to Beverly Ochieng of Control Risks, a consultancy. Even before finalizing the deal with Barrick, Mali had secured or been promised over $635 million in additional tax payments, as reported by Reuters. In late 2024, Australia’s Resolute Mining agreed to pay $160 million after its chief executive was detained for more than a week.

Mali’s approach has not gone unnoticed by its neighbors. Last year, Niger’s government revoked the mining license of Orano, a French state-owned nuclear fuel company. Amid ongoing legal proceedings, it blocked uranium exports and pledged to bring the mines “back to the public domain of the state.” Meanwhile, Burkina Faso’s government, though generally more accommodating to Western investors, has taken similar steps by nationalizing two mines and seizing gold extracted by a Canadian company under the justification of “public necessity.” In response, Sarama Resources, an Australia-based gold miner, has launched an arbitration case to contest the withdrawal of one of its exploration permits.

Some worry that the motivations behind the three juntas’ actions stem primarily from hostility toward the West. In recent years, all three countries have expelled Western—primarily French—troops and turned to Russian mercenaries for assistance in fighting jihadists. Niger’s confrontation with Orano, in particular, appears to be heavily influenced by geopolitical factors. In Mali and Burkina Faso, too, countries like Russia, China, and Turkey are poised to benefit from this shift. “We see partners being preferred on the basis of nationality,” a Western diplomat in Bamako observed. In December, Ganfeng Lithium, China’s largest lithium producer, inaugurated a massive mine in southern Mali. “The Russians and Chinese are stepping in. Who is losing?” asked Moussa Kondo of the Sahel Institute, a Malian think tank.

However, the geopolitical shift has its limits. Of the three countries, only Burkina Faso currently hosts a Russian-owned industrial mine. “I don’t think they actually want to break the relationship with Western multinationals,” argues Ulf Laessing of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bamako.

Ultimately, financial concerns appear to outweigh ideological ones. All three economies are struggling amid ongoing security challenges. Since Burkina Faso’s military took power in 2022, four mines have shut down. Mali’s junta is reportedly finding it difficult to cover the costs of Wagner Group, the Russian mercenary force it enlisted in 2021. The need for additional revenue is not limited to the mining sector. This month, the Malian government introduced new taxes on phone calls and mobile-money transactions. Last year, it required Maroc Telecom to pay $272 million to renew its operating license.

Local business owners in Bamako are voicing frustration over rising tax burdens. “Everything has gone up,” complains Yusuf Diarra, a water-tank salesman. However, the government’s crackdown on foreign companies appears to have widespread public support. Even Malians who are critical of the junta acknowledge that previous mining codes were overly favorable to mining firms. “Changing the 2019 code took guts, and had to be done,” says Modibo Mao Makalou, a well-known local economist.

Yet, the government’s approach could have long-term consequences for Mali’s economy. According to the country’s mines ministry, annual gold production dropped by nearly a quarter in 2024. While major players like Barrick—one of Mali’s largest private employers—are not pulling out, they may hesitate before making further investments. Robex Resources, another Canadian firm, has already announced plans to sell its gold mine. “Mining is by far the foundation of that economy, and you can destroy it in a heartbeat,” warns Mark Bristow.

For now, few Western mining firms appear eager to leave the Sahel. In Burkina Faso, three major Canadian miners report maintaining good relations with the junta. While Niger’s government revoked a permit from a Canadian uranium producer last year due to delays in asset development, another company continues to operate without issue. Bristow suggests that Barrick would reject any demands that threaten the economic viability of its operations in Mali but remains open to negotiations. “I am very happy to search for ways for the state to get more of the [tax] take,” he says.

Despite ongoing tensions, both governments and mining companies have strong reasons to maintain cooperation.